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THE SUPREME COURT FAILS TO DECIDE
THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION ISSUE:
MACDONALD, SOMMER & FRA TES v
YOLO COUNTY
JAMES GEOFFREY DURHAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
The last six years have been interesting for those concerned with
regulatory takings1 and inverse condemnation.' During these years,
the United States Supreme Court decided four cases3 that raised expec-
tations as to whether the Court would decide if an excessive govern-
* Associate Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. A.B. 1973, University
of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1976, University of California, Davis. A shorter version of
this article was published last fall. See Durham, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County: The Supreme Court Again Dodges the Inverse Condemnation Issue, 9 ZONING
& PLAN. L. REP. 65 (1986).
1. A regulatory taking occurs when the owner of property (real or personal) argues
that his property has been taken because its value has been diminished by governmental
regulation. The argument increasingly has been made in zoning cases, in which the
value of real property is substantially decreased either by a municipality's changing the
zoning of the real property or by a municipality's refusal to allow development of real
property as zoned.
2. The United States Supreme Court has described inverse condemnation as "a
shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation
for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted."
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
3. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); William-
son County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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mental regulation can become a taking and, if so, what remedies are
available to one whose property has been taken. Although it is now
reasonably clear that regulatory action that goes too far may be a tak-
ing, a question still remains: once a taking is found, what is the rem-
edy? The Court failed to provide the answer, despite the wealth of
opportunities that these four cases offered.
The first opportunity came in the 1980 case of Agins v. City of
Tiburon,4 in which the Court held that no taking occurred when a city
downzoned the claimant's land. Justice Powell, speaking for a unani-
mous Court, left the door open for a future case in which the Court
would consider what remedies would be available to the landowner.'
Less than one year later, Justice Brennan raised inverse condemnation
proponents' hope in his dissent, joined by three other justices, in the
Court's 1981 decision of another downzoning case, San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.' Because Justice Rehnquist's concur-
ring opinion agreed in principle with Justice Brennan's dissent,7 many
proponents felt that it would be only a matter of time before the Court
would rule that the fifth amendment demanded damages for inverse
condemnation.8
Practitioners and academicians awaited further consideration of the
issue by the Court. Most felt that the Court had a suitable case in
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.'
The Court's decision in 1985, however, did not reach the merits.
Shortly after it decided Hamilton Bank, the Court accepted the appeal
of MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,'0 an inverse condem-
nation case prompted by a county's refusal to permit land development
in accordance with its current zoning.
Eight months of speculation ended in June 1986, but the Court again
dodged the issue. MacDonald, like San Diego Gas & Electric and
Hamilton Bank before it, merely titillates; it does not satisfy. In fact,
4. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
5. Id. at 263.
6. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
7. Id. at 633-34.
8. See, e.g., Hagman, Comment on San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 33 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 5, at 5 (1981); Kanner, Comment on San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 33 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 5,
at 8 (1981).
9. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
10. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
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proponents of inverse condemnation may conclude that MacDonald
leaves them farther from satisfaction than they thought possible after
San Diego Gas & Electric. These proponents do have some hope, how-
ever, because the Court has before it no fewer than three inverse con-
demnation suits in its current term: two more California land use
cases, First English Evangelical Luthern Church v. County of Los Ange-
les" and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,12 and a Penn-
sylvania coal mining case, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis,3 which apparently raises the same issue as the classic
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.14
The purpose of this article is to review and organize the current law
of inverse condemnation in light of MacDonald. First this article
briefly reviews the origin of inverse condemnation and the tangled web
woven by the Court in Agins, San Diego Gas, and Hamilton Bank. Sec-
ond, the article reviews MacDonald and the state of the law after Mac-
Donald. Finally, the article provides some insight into what action can
be expected from the Court on inverse condemnation and finishes with
some practical considerations for current land use disputes.
II. INVERSE CONDEMNATION BEFORE MACDONALD
A. The Origins of Inverse Condemnation
Responsibility for the concept of "inverse condemnation" can be laid
at the feet of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.. Writing for the majority in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Holmes opined that "[t]he general
rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.""5 Although
an earlier part of his opinion in Pennsylvania Coal referred to the need
11. Lutheran Church involves a fifth amendment taking claim in which a county
ordinance zoned part of the church's land as a flood plain, thereby stopping the church
from building on that part of its land. The Supreme Court has noted probable juris-
dicton in the case. 106 S. Ct. 3292 (1986).
12. Nollan involves a claim that a taking occurred when a county demanded public
access to a privately owned beach before issuing a building permit to convert a summer
cottage into a permanent home. The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in
the case. 107 S. Ct. 312 (1986).
13. 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1456 (1986). Keystone
involves a claim that a taking occurred when the state prohibited the mining of coal in
certain areas. The Court heard argument in the case on November 10, 1986. 55
U.S.L.W. 3372 (Nov. 10, 1986).
14. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
15. Id. at 415.
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for the use of eminent domain if the regulation went too far, 16 Holmes'
conceptualization that a regulation that goes too far is a taking has
become the important contribution of the opinion.' 7 Although Holmes
can be credited, or blamed, for originating the concept, there is some
doubt whether he intended to create the concept.
1. The "Due Process" Clause or the "Eminent Domain" Clause?
If by calling an excessive governmental regulation a "taking" one
intends to literally invoke the "eminent domain" clause of the fifth
amendment,'" the argument is that the logical remedy is "just compen-
sation."'I On the other hand, if by calling an excessive governmental
regulation a "taking" one means that a claimant has been deprived of
property under the "due process" clause,2° the argument is that the
logical remedy is invalidation of the statute in whole or as applied to
the particular claimant.2 ' Justice Holmes' statement in Pennsylvania
Coal stands at the center of the dispute as to how the term "taking"
should be read.
Some commentators have rejected the "inverse condemnation" read-
ing of Justice Holmes' statement.22 Arguably, the statement is nothing
more than a metaphor.23 If a regulation goes too far, the regulation
does not literally become a taking that requires the payment of just
16. Id. at 413.
17. This is particularly true after Justice Brennan focused on this language in San
Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 649.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment reads in pertinent part: "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
19. See Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S..
at 636.
20. U.S. CONST. amend V. The fifth amendment reads in pertinent part: "nor shall
be deprived of the life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
21. See Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3125.
22. See, e.g., Callies, The Taking Issue Revisted, 37 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.
No. 7, at 6 (1985); Girard, Agins: A Step in the Right Direction, 31 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. No. 9, at 3 (1979); Siemon, Comment on San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 33 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 5, at 6 (1981); Stoebuck, Agins:
A Step in the Right Direction (And Over the Precipice), 32 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.
No. 3, at 5 (1980).
23. The New York Court of Appeals described Holmes' use of the word "taking"
with respect to overly-intrusive regulations as "metaphorical" in Fred F. French Inv.
Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 595, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9,
appeal denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). Justice Brennan used the term in San Diego Gas &
Electric and attributed the language to French. See 450 U.S. at 649 n. 14.
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compensation. Instead, the regulation is void. If one accepts this, a
government must literally take the property in question by eminent do-
main in order to carry out its stated purpose.
There is some justification for this argument. First, in Pennsylvania
Coal Justice Holmes also said, "One fact for consideration in determin-
ing such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a cer-
tain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."24 Arguably,
courts have interpreted Justice Holmes's statement, "if a regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking," out of context. The real
meaning of Pennsylvania Coal is that if a regulation goes too far it is
invalid, and if the government still wants to accomplish the regulatory
goal it must use eminent domain to acquire the property interest of-
fended by the regulation.
Justice Stevens advanced a second argument in his concurring opin-
ion in Hamilton Bank. Justice Stevens first distinguished "permanent
harms" and "temporary harms."2 5 He then proceeded to consider the
claimed taking in Hamilton Bank as a permanent taking, and con-
cluded that:
[T]he essence of the holding is a conclusion that the harm caused
by the regulation is one that the Government may not impose un-
less it is prepared to pay for it. In my opinion, when such a situa-
tion develops, there is nothing in the Constitution that prevents
the Government from electing to abandon the permanent-harm-
causing regulation. The fact that a jurist as eminent as Oliver
Wendell Holmes characterized a regulation that "goes too far" as
a "taking" does not mean that such a regulation may never be
cancelled and must always give rise to a right to compensation.26
The thrust of the argument appears to be that merely calling a gov-
ernmental action a taking does not mean that the claimant is entitled to
"just compensation"; the government also has the option of rescinding
the regulation.
With respect to temporary takings, Justice Stevens concluded that
24. 260 U.S. at 413.
25. Justice Stevens stated:
"The substance of a restriction may permanently curtail the economic value of the
property. Or the procedures that must be employed, either to obtain permission to
use property in a particular way or to remove an unlanful restriction on its use, may
temporarily deprive the owner of a fair return on his investment."
105 S. Ct. at 3125 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 3125-26.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
74 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:69
the eminent domain clause did not mandate compensation. 27 The es-
sence of Justice Stevens' view is that if a claimant has received proce-
dural due process, the government should be able to make the
conscious choice of rescinding the regulation or exercising its power of
eminent domain. Inverse condemnation, Stevens reasoned, makes both
the paying of compensation and the amount of compensation a surprise
to the government that has enacted the challenged regulation. Thus, as
a logical conclusion to this line of reasoning, a court should invalidate
the regulation and let the government decide if it wants to proceed by
eminent domain or abandon the purpose of the regulation altogether.
The Court has adopted defacto the "due process" view of regulatory
takings in its four non-decisions.28 Nonetheless, the Court has left
open the possibility that it might explicitly adopt inverse condemna-
tion. If the Court, after flirting with inverse condemnation for the last
seven years, finally adopts the "eminent domain" view of regulatory
takings, there is still one more threshold question: what is a taking?
2. What Constitutes a "Taking"
Justice Brennan addressed the issue of what constitutes a taking in
his noted majority opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City: "[W]e have frequently observed that whether a particular
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay
for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely 'upon the par-
ticular circumstances [in that] case.' "29 It is an understatement to say
that Justice Brennan's formulation says little. In fact, he goes on to
describe the Court's determinations of what constitutes a taking as "es-
sentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."3 Further, Agins, San Diego Gas &
27. Stevens stated:
If his property is harmed-even temporarily-without due process of law, he may
have a claim for damages based on the denial of his procedural rights. But if the
procedure that has been employed to determine whether a particular regulation
"goes too far" is fair, I know of nothing in the Constitution that entitles him to
recover for this type of temporary harm.
Id. at 3126-27.
28. By failing to find that a taking was properly alleged or proven in each of the
cases, the Court left the claimants with only procedural due process arguments that
three of the claimants have declined to make and the fourth, Hamilton Bank, could not
prove. Only in Hamilton Bank did the claimant assert that its procedural due process
rights were violated, and the jury found in favor of the county on that cause of action.
Id. at 3127.
29. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
30. Id. at 124.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/3
INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Electric, and Hamilton Bank have added little to the formulation of
what constitutes a taking because in each case the majority found that
no taking had occurred.
What constitutes a taking is a critical question in these cases because
the Court either agreed with the lower courts that no taking occurred
31
or held that the issue was not ripe.32 The Court in each of these cases
did not consider the appropriate remedies if a taking were found. The
purpose of this article is not to review the myriad of cases and articles
33
that have dealt with the takings question. This article is concerned
with whether the Court will allow inverse condemnation when it deter-
mines that a taking has occurred by a municipality's downzoning land
or not allowing the land to be developed as zoned. While it is hard to
predict when the Court will find that a taking has occurred, in past
cases the Court has found regulatory takings.34 The issue, then, is the
proper remedy if a taking is found.
3. The Remedy for a Taking: The Importance of Penn Central
Although Agins appears to be the modem starting point for tracing
how the Court has dealt with the issue of remedies for inverse condem-
nation, a somewhat earlier point is Justice Brennan's majority opinion
in Penn Central. Penn Central involved a railroad's claim that its prop-
erty was taken when New York City refused to approve either of two
designs for an office building to be built atop Grand Central Termi-
nal.3 5 Justice Brennan began his majority opinion with this issue:
The question presented is whether a city may, as part of a compre-
hensive program to preserve historic landmarks and historic dis-
tricts, place restrictions on the development of individual historic
31. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
32. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
33. See e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984); Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional
Model for the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Michelman, Property, Util-
ity, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings
Juriprudence, 61 NOTRE DANE L. REV. 372 (1986); Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sterk, Governmental Liability for Unconstitu-
tional Land Use Regulation, 60 IND. L.J. 113 (1984).
34. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
35. 438 U.S. at 115-16.
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landmarks-in addition to those imposed by applicable zoning or-
dinances-without effecting a "taking" requiring the payment of
"'just compensation."36 [emphasis added]
Justice Brennan went on to hold that there was no taking of the
railroad's property, 37 and laid the groundwork for the recent inverse
condemnation cases.
B. The Agins Case
The Court's first serious review of a claim that a land use regulation
constituted a taking was Agins v. City of Tiburon.38 Agins involved the
downzoning of a valuable five acre parcel from multi-family use to sin-
gle-family use. Agins alleged that the five acres had "greater value
than any other suburban property" in California, and that the land had
"'the highest market values of all lands' in Tiburon. ' '39 Although
Agins had not applied for approval to develop the land, he sued the
city, alleging that there had been a taking of his land and that he was
entitled to $2,000,000 as just compensation.
The trial court granted the city's demurrer to Agins' complaint.'
The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no tak-
ing, and that even if there was, Agins' only remedies were mandamus
and declaratory relief.4 The California Supreme Court stated that a
claimant alleging a regulatory taking cannot "sue in inverse condemna-
tion and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a
lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be
paid."42 After defining the remedies available to a regulatory takings
claimant, the California Supreme Court went on to hold that Agins'
property was not taken and that he was not entitled to relief. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous decision written
by Justice Powell, but only on the basis that no taking had occurred.
The Court found that the sole issue was whether the enactment of a
zoning ordinance could alone be a taking: "Because the appellants
have not submitted a plan for development of their property as the
ordinances permit, there is as yet no concrete controversy regarding
36. Id. at 107.
37. Id. at 138.
38. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
39. Id. at 258.
40. Id.
41. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
42. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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the application of the specific zoning provisions."43 Justice Powell
then cited the classic zoning cases and Penn Central to hold that there
was no taking because the state advanced a legitimate state interest and
the claimant still had the economically viable use of building five sin-
gle-family homes on his land.'
Concerning the issue of remedies, Justice Powell stated: "Because
no taking has occurred, we need not consider whether a State may
limit the remedies available to a person whose land has been taken
without just compensation."45 Agins set the stage for a battle over in-
verse condemnation. The Court had left open two questions: (1) what
if the zoning ordinance did deprive the claimant of all economically
viable use, and (2) what if the claimant had attempted to develop his
land?
C. The San Diego Gas & Electric Case
Only nine months after deciding Agins, the Court decided San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,46 a case that had the potential
of answering the first of the questions stated above. In San Diego Gas
& Electric, the San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) spent
$1,770,000 assembling 412 acres as a possible site for a nuclear power
plant. The city then placed most of the site in an "open-space" zone.
SDG&E then brought a mandamus action against the city, and sued
the city for inverse condemnation, seeking $6,150,000 as just
compensation.
Before the California Supreme Court decided Agins, the trial court in
San Diego Gas & Electric dismissed the mandamus action as "not the
proper remedy," but ruled that the city's actions had deprived SDG&E
of "all practical, beneficial or economic use of the property."47 In a
subsequent jury trial to determine damages, SDG&E was awarded
$3,000,000.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed, but the California Supreme
Court vacated the court of appeal's decision.48 The California
Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeal for reconsid-
43. 447 U.S. at 260.
44. Id. at 262-63.
45. Id. at 263.
46. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
47. Id. at 626.
48. Id. at 628.
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eration in light of the supreme court's opinion in Agins. The court of
appeal reversed itself and the trial court by holding, consistent with
Agins, that inverse condemnation was not available to SDG&E and
that its sole remedies were mandamus and declaratory relief.49 The
California Supreme Court denied further review, and SDG&E ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Ste-
vens and White, held that the case was not reviewable because the Cali-
fornia courts had not made a final decision that a taking had
occurred.50 Justice Blackmun concluded his opinion with dicta that
provided some hope for the proponents of inverse condemnation:
Thus, however we might rule with respect to the Court of Ap-
peal's decision that appellant is not entitled to a monetary rem-
edy-and we are frank to say that the federal constitutional
aspects of that issue are not to be cast aside lightly-further pro-
ceedings are necessary to resolve the federal question whether
there has been a taking at all.51
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result, forming the necessary five
vote majority for disposal of the case. Justice Rehnquist began his
opinion, however, with words that seemed to give the proponents rea-
son for celebration:
If I were satisfied that this appeal was from a "final judgment or
decree" of the California Court of Appeal, as that term is used in
28 U.S.C. § 1257, I would have little difficulty in agreeing with
much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan.52
The focus of the case, therefore, was taken from the majority's "non-
decision" and placed on Justice Brennan's dissent.
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and
Stewart. Justice Brennan cited Justice Holmes' famous quote from
Pennsylvania Coal,5" and proceeded to adopt the eminent domain the-
ory of regulatory takings. He stated his view simply:
[O]nce a court establishes that there was a regulatory "taking,"
the Constitution demands that the government entity pay just
compensation for the period commencing on the date the regula-
49. Id. at 629-30.
50. Id. at 633.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 633-34.
53. Id. at 649. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
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tion first effected the "taking," and ending on the date the govern-
ment entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the
regulation.
5 4
At this point, the proponents of inverse condemnation could reason-
ably believe that the Court would adopt their position when presented
with the right case.
D. The Hamilton Bank Case
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,55 a Tennessee case on appeal from the Sixth Circuit, appeared to
be the right case. 6 While the claimants in Agins and San Diego Gas
based their taking claims on the application of zoning ordinances, the
claimant in Hamilton Bank based its claim on denial of its plans to
subdivide land. These plans comported with the zoning ordinance in
effect at the time that the development was first approved.
In 1973 the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission ap-
proved the preliminary plat for over 700 dwelling units on a 676 acre
tract. The developer, Hamilton Bank's predecessor, intended to build
a golf course surrounded by homes. The developer spent about
$3,000,000 on the golf course, and began subdividing other land for
home sites. In 1977 the county changed its zoning ordinance to reduce
the number of houses the developer could build from that originally
approved. Nonetheless, through 1979 the Planning Commission con-
tinued to apply the 1973 zoning ordinance and gave final approval to
the construction of 212 houses.
In 1980 the Planning Commission asked the developer to submit a
revised preliminary plat before it sought final approval for the remain-
ing sections of the development. The Commission raised several objec-
tions to the revised preliminary plat, and applying the 1977 ordinance,
disapproved the plat primarily because of the density of the proposed
development. The developer appealed to the County Board of Zoning
Appeals, and the Board determined that the Planning Commission
should apply the 1973 ordinance.
After foreclosing on most of the remaining land owned by the devel-
oper, Hamilton Bank resubmitted two preliminary plats to the Plan-
54. 450 U.S. at 653.
55. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
56. See Bauman, Deja Vu, or Et Tu Supreme Court? 37 LAND USE L. & ZONING
DIG. No. 7, at 3 (1985); Callies, supra note 22, at 6; Morgan, Regulatory "Takings" A
Pragmatic Approach; 37 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 7, at 4 (1985).
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ning Commission in 1981. One plat had been approved in 1973 and
reapproved several times thereafter, and the other showed the final
plans for development of the vacant land. The Planning Commission
rejected the preliminary plats and refused to follow the 1973 ordinance
as directed by the County Board of Zoning Appeals.
Hamilton Bank then filed suit in federal court for inverse condemna-
tion and a declaration that state law estopped the Planning Commis-
sion from denying approval of the preliminary plats as submitted."
After trial, the jury found that Hamilton Bank had been denied the
"economically viable" use of its property and awarded it $350,000 in
damages for the temporary taking. 8 The district court granted judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed, reinstating the jury's decision. 9
In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, held that the case was
not ripe.6 First, Justice Blackmun opined that there had not yet been
a "final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and
subdivision regulations" to Hamilton Bank's property.6" In addition,
Hamilton Bank had not used state procedures for obtaining just com-
pensation.62 Finally, in what one commentator has referred to as a
"small bombshell, ' 6 3 the Court held that until a claimant has ex-
hausted all state law remedies, he is precluded from bringing a section
1983 action in federal court.6 4
Justice Brennan concurred65 and reiterated his position in his dissent
in San Diego Gas, but he agreed with Justice Blackmun that the case
was not ripe.66 Justice White dissented from the holding that the issues
were not ripe, but did not file an opinion.67
57. 105 S. Ct. at 3114.
58. Id. at 3115.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3124-25. Justice Powell did not take part in the case, Justices Brennan
and Marshall concurred in the opinion, Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, and
Justice White dissented from the judgment.
61. Id. at 3117.
62. Id.
63. Bauman, Hamilton Bank. No Decision on the Compensation Issue, 8 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP. 137 (1985).
64. 105 S. Ct. at 3121.
65. Justice Marshall joined Brennan's concurring opinion.
66. 105 S. Ct. at 3124-25.
67. Id. at 3124.
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Justice Stevens wrote the most interesting opinion, concurring in the
judgment but not in the reasoning of the Court.68 Justice Stevens ex-
plicitly rejected the concept of inverse condemnation and struck at the
heart of its historical justification: "The fact that a jurist as eminent as
Oliver Wendell Holmes characterized a regulation that 'goes too far' as
a 'taking' does not mean that such a regulation may never be cancelled
and must always give rise to a right of compensation."69 He explained
that the claimant could argue only that his procedural due process
rights were violated and that because the jury rejected Hamilton
Bank's due process claim, the judgment should be reversed.7"
Hamilton Bank left regulatory taking law in turmoil. It was clear
that a claimant must pursue all state law remedies and receive a "final
determination" with respect to permissible land uses. It was just as
clear, however, that no one knew just what constituted a "final
determination."
III. MAcDONALD AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. The MacDonald Case
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County7 1 was decided almost
exactly one year after Hamilton Bank. After the Court's non-decision
in Hamilton Bank, it appeared likely that the Court would finally con-
front the inverse condemnation issue.
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates (MacDonald) owned land in Yolo
County, California, which is adjacent to the City of Davis, California.
The land was used for agricultural purposes but was designated on the
general plan and zoned for residential use. MacDonald desired to sub-
divide the land into lots for 159 single and multi-family structures. In
1975, MacDonald submitted a tentative subdivision map to the Yolo
County Planning Commission.72
The Planning Commission rejected the map, and the County's Board
of Supervisors affirmed the Planning Commission's decision. The
Board cited several reasons why the map was not consistent with the
68. Id. at 3125-27.
69. Id. at 3125-26.
70. Id. at 3127.
71. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
72. Seeking approval of a tentative subdivision map is the first official step a Califor-
nia subdivider must take in order to gain final approval for a subdivision. See CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 66452 (West Supp. 1987).
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county's general plan or the county's zoning regulations.73
Rather than modify the proposal and resubmit it, MacDonald filed
suit in California Superior Court, seeking two different forms of relief.
The suit sought a writ of mandate to force the county to reconsider its
decision, and declaratory relief and damages for inverse condemna-
tion.74 In its claim for inverse condemnation, MacDonald asserted
that the city and the county had restricted its land to an "open-space
agricultural use by denying all permit applications, subdivision maps,
and other requests to implement any other use."7 5 According to the
complaint, the result of the city and county actions was the appropria-
tion of the "entire economic use" of MacDonald's land for "a public,
open-space buffer.",76 Finally, the complaint alleged that "any applica-
tion for a zone change, variance or other relief would be futile.",77
The city and the county demurred.7' The Superior Court granted
the demurrer, noting that MacDonald could use the land for agricul-
ture, agricultural storage facilities, and ranch and farm dwellings.79
The Superior Court specifically rejected MacDonald's conclusory alle-
gations that the county precluded every principal use and left the prop-
erty valueless as zoned. s° The Superior Court also concluded that
monetary damages for inverse condemnation are precluded in Califor-
nia by Agins v. City of Tiburon."1
MacDonald appealed the inverse condemnation claim to the Califor-
73. 106 S. Ct. at 2563. MacDonald's subsequent suit focused on four of the Board's
allegedly improper reasons:
1. The map provided for access from only one public street, a street that the
city refused to grant permission to extend;
2. The map did not provide for sewer service by any governmental entity, and
there was no pending application for sewer service;
3. The county would be unable to provide "intense enough" police protection;
and
4. The map indicated no provision for a water system by any governmental
entity.
Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2563-64.
77. Id. at 2564.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255
(1980).
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nia Court of Appeal.82 The court held that even if MacDonald could
establish a fifth amendment taking, Agins limited MacDonald's remedy
to overturning the statute as applied to its property. 83 The court, how-
ever, held that there had been no taking. In its unpublished opinion
the court of appeal stated:
Here plaintiff applied for approval of a particular and relatively
intensive residential development and the application was denied.
The denial of the particular plan cannot be equated with a refusal
to permit any development. . . .Land use planning is not an all-
or-nothing proposition. . . . Here, as in Agins, the refusal of the
defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the
landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable de-
velopment.84 [emphasis added]
MacDonald pressed on to the United States Supreme Court. Writ-
ing for a five-justice majority, Justice Stevens held that there had been
no taking of MacDonald's land because MacDonald "[s]till has yet to
receive the Board's 'final, definitive position regarding how it will apply
the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.' "" Justice
Stevens then referred to the Court's holdings in Agins, San Diego Gas &
Electric, and Hamilton Bank and concluded by stating: "[I]n this case,
the holdings of both courts below leave open the possibility that some
development will be permitted, and thus again leave us in doubt re-
garding the antecedent question whether appellant's property has been
taken."86
Justice White wrote a strong dissent.87 He primarily addressed the
Court's treatment of the case's procedural aspects, and came to the
conclusion that MacDonald had stated a taking claim. 8 Justice White
added that the Court's prior decisions should not be read to require a
potential inverse condemnation claimant to either make "repeated ap-
82. MacDonald's petition to the California Superior Court for a writ of mandamus
was still pending at the time the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case. 106 S. Ct. at
2563.
83. Id. at 2565.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2568.
86. Id. at 2568-69.
87. Id. at 2569. Chief Justice Burger joined the dissent in whole and Justices Rehn-
quist and Powell joined in part.
88. Id. Justice White stated, "The factual allegations that we must consider, when
the opinion below is correctly read, do state a takings claim and therefore present the
remedial question that we have thrice before sought to resolve." Id.
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plications" or receive the "decisionmaker's definitive position" before
the claimant has a viable claim for inverse condemnation.89 Finally,
Justice White concluded by reiterating his support for Justice Bren-
nan's articulation of damages for inverse condemnation in San Diego
Gas. 90
Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice White's procedural analysis of
the case but declined to echo White's unqualified support for Justice
Brennan's position in San Diego Gas:
As Justice White recognizes in Part IV of his opinion [Justice
White's support of damages for inverse condemnation], the ques-
tions surrounding what compensation, if any, is due a property
owner in the context of "interim" takings are multifaceted and
difficult. I would not reach these questions without first permit-
ting the courts below to address them in light of the fact that
[MacDonald] has sufficiently alleged a taking.91
Justice Rehnquist's refusal to rule on the damages question could mean
that either he wants to see how a lower court will formulate a damage
remedy or, less likely although still possible, he is rethinking whether
damages should be a remedy at all.
B. The Supreme Court After MacDonald
It is always a treacherous undertaking to predict what the Court will
do, and any predictions as to how the Court will handle the inverse
condemnation issue must take into account the changes in personnel
on the Court. First, Justice Stewart, who joined Justice Brennan's dis-
sent in San Diego Gas, retired from the Court and was replaced by
Justice O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger also retired from the Court
and was replaced as Chief Justice by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehn-
quist was in turn replaced by Judge Antonin Scalia of the District of
Columbia Circuit.92 Nonetheless, one can consider how the incumbent
justices have voted on inverse condemnation and the Court's decision
in MacDonald in order to predict the Court's outcome in three regula-
tory taking cases scheduled for consideration. 93
Three justices appear to be firmly in favor of some form of inverse
89. Id. at 2571.
90. Id. at 2573.
91. Id. at 2574.
92. Justice Scalia is a former professor of the University of Chicago School of Law
and a noted law and economics scholar.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/3
INVERSE CONDEMNATION
condemnation. Despite joining the majority opinion in MacDonald,
Justice Brennan restated as recently as Hamilton Bank" the position
he first articulated in his majority opinion in Penn Central and ex-
panded on in San Diego Gas & Electric. While his alignment with the
majority in MacDonald may indicate some second thoughts about in-
verse condemnation, such an argument is not particularly persuasive
when one considers the strength of his views in San Diego Gas & Elec-
tric and Hamilton Bank. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan with-
out separate statement in each of the inverse condemnation cases.
Justice White made it clear in his dissent in MacDonald that he is fully
in favor of inverse condemnation. 95
The next step is more difficult, but it appears that at least two otherjustices are in favor of inverse condemnation. Justice Powell joined
Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric, and also joined
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in MacDonald. Justice Rehnquist, whose
concurrence in San Diego Gas & Electric stated that he would have
"little difficulty in agreeing with much of" Justice Brennan's dissent,96
dissented in MacDonald in a very interesting way. He referenced Jus-
tice White's statement that the issues surrounding damages for "in-
terim" takings are "multifaceted and difficult," and then concluded
that he would remand for determination of those damages.97 Taking
Justice Rehnquist's statements at face value, one can conclude that he
favors inverse condemnation but will withhold determination of dam-
ages until after a judgment either allowing or disallowing damages. It
appears, then, that at least five justices favor inverse condemnation.
On the other side, Justice Stevens, in his Hamilton Bank concur-
rence, has made it clear that he is opposed to inverse condemnation.
As he stated in Hamilton Bank, "[t]emporary harms [that are by-prod-
ucts of governmental decision making] are an unfortunate but neces-
sary by-product of disputes over the extent of the Government's power
to inflict permanent harms without paying for them."9 8 As to perma-
nent takings, Justice Stevens concludes that the claimant's proper rem-
edy is invalidation of the governmental regulation.
The remaining three justices' positions are more difficult to predict.
Justice Blackmun has voted with the majority in each of the cases re-
94. 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3124-25 (1985).
95. 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2572-73 (1986).
96. 450 U.S. 621, 633-34 (1981).
97. 106 S. Ct. at 2574.
98. 105 S. Ct. at 3126.
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viewed in this article, and he wrote the Court's opinions in both San
Diego Gas & Electric and Hamilton Bank. One could conclude that he
opposes inverse condemnation, but if he does he would have joined
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Hamilton Bank. Justice
O'Connor is in a similar position. She was not on the Court when
Penn Central, Agins, or San Diego Gas & Electric were decided, but she
joined the majority opinions in Hamilton Bank and MacDonald. Fur-
thermore, she did not join Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Ham-
ilton Bank. Finally, Justice Scalia, as the newest member of the Court,
is the greatest unknown.
The expected vote on the "right" inverse condemnation case is,
therefore, five to one in favor of inverse condemnation, with three
unknowns. This should cheer the proponents of inverse condemnation,
but it hardly strikes fear into the hearts of its opponents. The final
issue is determining the "right" inverse condemnation case.
IV. BEYOND MACDONALD
A. The "Right" Inverse Condemnation Case
Asking what constitutes the "right" inverse condemnation case is
misleading because the question assumes there is a "right" inverse con-
demnation case. As the Court has worked its way through several reg-
ulatory takings cases over the last decade, commentators speculated
that the current case before the Court was the "right" one.99 By con-
sistently accepting cases that raise the inverse condemnation issue, only
to render non-decisions, the Court has left itself open for a great deal of
second-guessing.
Despite the Court's non-decisions and the justices' inconsistencies,
the "right" inverse condemnation case apparently must have several
elements. First, the claimant must have at least attempted to obtain
approval of his development plans by the appropriate regulatory body.
This point can arguably be gleaned from Justice Powell's observation
in Agins that "[b]ecause the appellants have not submitted a plan for
development of their property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet
no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning
provision."1 0 Justice Blackmun drove the point home in Hamilton
99. Such speculation is inevitable. The Cout has fueled the speculation, however,
by reviewing the several cases discussed in this article in a relatively short period of
time.
100. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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Bank by stating that the Bank had "submitted a plan for developing its
property, and thus has passed beyond the Agins threshold."''°
Second, even if the claimant meets the Agins threshold, submission
of only one plan for development may not be enough. In Hamilton
Bank the developer submitted a plan and successfully appealed its de-
nial to the County Board of Zoning Appeals. Nonetheless, the Plan-
ning Commission refused to follow the direction of the County Board
of Zoning Appeals, and the developer sued. The Supreme Court em-
phasized that the Bank had not appealed the Planning Commission's
decision, nor had it sought variances in order to be able to develop the
land as proposed.' °2 Justice Stevens clearly required more than one
application in MacDonald by stating:
Here, in comparison to the situations of the property owners in
[Agins, San Diego Gas & Electric, and Hamilton Bank], appellant
has submitted one subdivision proposal and has received the
Board's response thereto. Nevertheless, appellant still has yet to
receive the Board's "final, definitive position regarding how it will
apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in
question." 103
Third, the claimant must exhaust virtually all administrative reme-
dies.' 04 This conclusion may not seem obvious, but considering all that
the developer and the bank did in Hamilton Bank, arguably a claimant
must not only try the obvious but show that he has gone the "extra
mile." Allegations of frustration and futility did not persuade the
Court in Penn Central Agins, San Diego Gas & Electric, Hamilton
Bank, or MacDonald. As Professor Callies concluded in discussing
MacDonald, "[T]he majority confirms it is going to be darned difficult
for a landowner to come before a federal court on a regulatory tak-
ing/compensation theory without having sought and been denied a lot
of permits."' 5 Justice Stevens added what Professor Callies called a
"parting shot"'0 6 in MacDonald by noting, "Rejection of exceedingly
grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less ambi-
101. 105 S. Ct. at 3117.
102. Id. at 3117-19.
103. 106 S. Ct. 2567-68.
104. See Callies, The "Full Bore"Application of Hamilton Bank, 38 LAND UsE L. &
ZONING DIG. No. 9, at 4-5 (1986).
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id.
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tious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews."1 7
Fourth, Hamilton Bank holds that in order to claim a violation of a
federal constitutional right, a claimant will have to be in one of two
positions. In the first position, the claim must arise in a state that has
expressly rejected inverse condemnation, such as California or New
York. 108 In the second position, provided for claimants in states that
have accepted inverse condemnation or at least have not rejected it, the
claimant must utilize any available procedure for compensation under
state law.109 Arguably, the second position includes not only the Ten-
nessee statutory procedure for compensation present in Hamilton
Bank, but also bringing an inverse condemnation suit in state court and
losing. As Gus Bauman put it, "In essence, the Court is closing the
federal courthouse door to nearly all Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment just compensation clause claims."" 0
Finally, consistent with the taking cases, the Court apparently wants
a showing of extensive damages and essentially arbitrary action by the
governmental entity charged with the taking. In general, the Court has
been unsympathetic to downzoning cases. The inverse condemnation
cases generally include elements of arbitrariness, and most involve new
or changing standards."'
B. Current Cases and Potential Cases
In addition to the previously discussed points, potential inverse con-
demnation claimants should consider several other points. First, sev-
eral state112 and federal 1 3 courts have ruled in favor of inverse
107. 106 S. Ct. at 2569 n.9.
108. As to California, see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). As to New York, see Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New
York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1977), and Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914
(1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
109. 105 S. Ct. at 3121.
110. Bauman, supra note 63, at 138.
111. Agins, San Diego Gas & Electric, and Hamilton Bank all involved the applica-
tion of new ordinances to the subject land.
112. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Corrigan, 149 Ariz. 553, 720 P.2d 528 (1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1987); Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D.
1983); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
113. See, e.g., Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct., 151 (1983); Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th
Cir. 1985); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 729
F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984).
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condemnation, or at least have stated they were leaning in that direc-
tion. On the other hand, other state courts, including two of the most
influential highest state courts, have rejected inverse condemnation.' 14
Finally, some federal courts have either rejected inverse condemna-
tion" 5 or have literally applied the various obstacles of Hamilton
Bank, including the need to seek state compensation remedies" 6 and
ripeness. 117
Furthermore, potential claimants must make their proposals for de-
velopment comply closely with existing regulations other than those
attacked. In each case, the Court has apparently looked for any other
reason to explain the downzoning of the parcel or the proposed develp-
ment's rejection. The Court has also made it clear that a potential
claimant must pursue all possible administrative and judicial avenues
of relief under state law. This requirement, however, cuts against the
need of most developers to proceed quickly, for the passage of time
usually translates into large monetary losses for a developer. The de-
veloper is then faced with the unenviable decision of whether to persist
in seeking approval for the development or to concede a loss and move
on to another location.
When opposing developers, municipalities have a tremendous advan-
tage in the inverse condemnation battle. Nonetheless, municipalities
are in a worse position than they were before courts raised the spectre
of inverse condemnation. In his dissent in San Diego Gas, Justice Bren-
nan recounts the advice one city attorney gave his peers: "If all else
fails, merely amend the regulation and start over.""' 8 A municipality
can, however, make it difficult for developers by following the Court's
insistence that the claimant pursue all avenues of relief under state law.
The municipality may leave open the possibility that it will reconsider
its decision, or provide for several methods of requesting variances or
114. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
115. See, e.g., Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 695 F.2d 31 (Ist Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) HMK Corp. v. County of Chesterfield, 616 F.
Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1985).
116. Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986); Four Seasons Apart-
ments v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1986).
117. Littlefleld v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986); HMK Corp. v.
County of Chesterfield, 616 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1985); Golemis v. Kirby, 623 F.
Supp. 1057 (D.R.I. 1986).
118. 450 U.S. at 655 n.22.
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conditional use permits. The best defense for municipalities may be to
give developers as many avenues of request and appeal as possible. In
addition, the more flexible a municipality is, the less likely it will face
an inverse condemnation action.
The Court has strongly indicated that it is interested only in cases in
which the municipality has refused to allow development or has se-
verely cut back on previously allowed development. The key, then,
may be good faith. If a municipality tries to work with developers and
provide for realistic uses of land, it is unlikely that the municipality will
lose an inverse condemnation action.
V. CONCLUSION
The law of inverse condemnation is still in a state of flux. Although
at least five justices of the Supreme Court may be ready to allow in-
verse condemnation when presented with the right case, proponents of
inverse condemnation should be concerned. Their opportunity for vic-
tory is on the wane because the Court has not yet found the right case.
The proponents' only option is to wait and see what the Court does
with its new inverse condemnation cases.
For opponents of inverse condemnation, victory may well be at
hand. Even if the Court is ready to embrace inverse condemnation, it
is having a difficult time finding the right case. Further, even if the
Court finds the right case, the facts indicating a taking may be so unu-
sual that a holding in favor of one inverse condemnation claimant may
have little practical effect on a municipality that administers its zoning
and development laws in good faith. Finally, the Court may get the
right case and reject inverse condemnation. Only time and circum-
stance will tell.
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